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STUDENT ARTICLES
Recent Congressional Responses to
Demands for Affordable Pharmaceuticals
By Andrew Harris*

I. Introduction
Despite Congress' recent proposals, the long, drawn-out
debate concerning high priced pharmaceuticals in the United States
remains as lively as ever. In July 2003, the House of Representatives
passed the Pharmaceutical Market Access Act ("PMAA"), 1 while in
December 2003 President George W. Bush signed the Medicare
Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act ("Medicare
Act") into law.2 While both efforts were advertised as comprehensive
responses to the issue over affordable pharmaceuticals, neither
appears to be a success.
The numerous issues involved in the debate over
pharmaceutical pricing illustrate the complexity of the problem and
the difficulty in providing a comprehensive answer to all concerns.
The issues range from how pharmaceuticals are priced, regulated,
patented, and distributed, to how pricing schemes abroad affect prices
in the United States. Congress was recently called upon to provide
relief from the high prices. However, its recent proposals appear to
simply be temporary solutions. An examination of the sources
dealing with the pharmaceutical pricing debate also underscores its
timeliness in this election year. The issue is hotly contested and will
likely remain this way for some time.
This article examines the relationship among United States
J.D. candidate, May 2005, Loyola University Chicago School of Law; B.A.
History, 2000, University of Wisconsin-Madison.
*

Pharmaceutical Market Access Act of 2003, H.R. 2427, 108th Cong. (2003).
2 Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003,
Pub. L. No. 108-173, 117 Stat. 2066 (2003).
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pharmaceutical companies, the federal government, and consumers
by illustrating the relative strength of the pharmaceutical companies,
the consumer animosity towards them because of high prices, and a
brief explanation of the reasons behind the elevated prices. With a
focus on price differentials between the United States and Canada,
this article notes the importance of the reimportation discussion,
especially considering consumers' easy access to cheaper drugs
immediately across the United States-Canadian border. While
consumers eagerly look across the border to acquire United Statesmanufactured drugs sold at much lower prices, opponents of
reimportation insist that the money saved is not worth the risks to
consumer safety. The reimportation discussion is important because it
is often the centerpiece of the pharmaceutical pricing debate, and no
piece of legislation has been, or will be, able to satisfy consumers
without wholly addressing it.
Following a review of recent federal legislation, including the
PMAA and the Medicare Act, this article discusses how the
legislation attempts to attack high prices, but does so in a very limited
manner, instead choosing to proffer modifications of existing
solutions. Next, the article proposes that the most recent legislation is
inevitably temporary and limited in nature and will likely be modified
again. As a result, Congress will be forced to answer many additional
questions and face alternative solutions proposed by others who
follow the pharmaceutical pricing debate closely.
Finally, with no viable relief in sight and reimportation issues
still unsettled, this article concludes that consumers and
pharmaceutical companies should expect to see Congress attempting
to deal with the pharmaceutical pricing issue once again in the near
future.

II. Background
A. The Strength of United States Drug Companies
An analysis of the PMAA and Medicare Act first calls for an
understanding of the enormity of the United States pharmaceutical
industry, in terms of both profits and political clout. In 2001,
pharmaceutical companies sent more lobbyists to Congress than the
entire United States population sent representatives. 3 Lobbying
3 See Drug Company Lobbyists Outnumber .Lawmakers, PUBLIC CITIZEN, at

http://www.mercola.com/2002/jun/26/lobbyists.htm

(June 13,

2002). See also
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occurs for a variety of reasons, one being the pharmaceutical
companies' efforts to stave off competition from generic drugs that
cut into their profits.4 Beyond such recognizable lobbying tactics,
pharmaceutical companies also employ other methods, such as
behind-the-scenes funding of political campaigns. 5 Additionally,
lobbying is aimed directly at consumers through advertising, which is
sometimes disguised as informative journalism. 6 In fact, the
billion on television and
pharmaceutical industry spent over $2
7
magazine advertisements in 2000 alone.
While making great lobbying efforts to promote its products
and strengthen its sales, the United States pharmaceutical industry
already stands head and shoulders above the rest of the world in the
production of new and effective treatments. Between 1970 and 1992,
American companies accounted for 42.8% of the world's
breakthrough drugs.8 Meanwhile, Britain accounted for 14%,
Germany 7%, and France 3%.9 From 1975 to 1989, American
companies produced 47 significant new pharmaceuticals, compared

Kevin Diaz, Four Minnesota Companies Have Million Dollar Lobbying Efforts,
STAR TRIBUNE, July 28, 2002, at Al (discussing the benefits of lobbying to former

politicians), available at 2002 WL 5379404. Exactly 623 lobbyists were sent, 23 of
whom were actually former members of Congress, and 54% of whom previously
worked for the United States government in some capacity. Id.
4 See, e.g., Naomi Aoki, Drugmakers Poised for Battle, Brand Name Firms
Up Stakes in Face of Generic Competition, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 26, 2001, at DI

(illustrating Bristol Meyer Squibb Co.'s attempt to prevent generic competition
against its diabetes drug, Glucophage), available at 2001 WL 31234441.
5 See, e.g.,

Theresa Agovino, Pharmaceutical Lobbying Effort Sparks
at
Change,
of
Pledge
and
Controversy
http://www.detnews.com/2002/health/0203/31/health-453010.htm (Mar. 30, 2002)

(discussing the attempts by such companies to generally defeat legislation for
lower-costs drugs).
6 See Melody Peterson, A Respected Face, But Is It News or an Ad?, N.Y.
http://www.yourlawyer.com/practice/news.htm?story-id=58455
at
&topic=Medical%20Malpractice (May 7, 2003) (providing an inside look at how
drug companies recently hired journalists to appear in videos resembling newscasts
to promote the companies' products).
7 Shawna Woodward, Will Price Control Legislation Satisfactorily Address
the Issue of High Prescription Drug Prices?: Several States Are Waiting in the
Balancefor PhRMA v. Concannon, 26 SEATTLE U. L. REv. 169, 173 (2002).

TIMES,

8 Jerry Stanton, Lessons for the U.S. from Foreign Price Controls on
Pharmaceuticals,16 CONN. J. INT'L L. 149, 154 (2000).
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to 50 for the rest of the world.'0 Presently, the United States is the
clear leader in the production of pharmaceuticals, easily
outdistancing any other nation."'
Furthermore, compared with other industries, the
pharmaceutical industry includes some of the most profitable
companies in the country.' 2 It is estimated that the pharmaceutical
sector as a whole profited to the tune of $27 billion in 2000.'" Such
profit margins were higher than any other industry in the United4
States and four times that of the average Fortune 500 company.'
However, proponents of limiting the regulation of pharmaceutical
companies argue that profit margins 5cannot be compared between the
pharmaceutical industry and others.'
B. Consumer Animosity Toward Pharmaceutical Companies
Consumers are angry over the rising cost of drugs. They see
pharmaceutical companies making tremendous profits at their
6
expense'
United States
considerably
17
prices for because
pharmaceuticals
than consumers
consumers pay
abroad.
Much higher
of the

10Id. at 153.

" See Derek Lowe, Do You Have a Drug Industry? Take This Simple Test!, at
http://www.corante.com/pipeline/20030601.shtml (June 9, 2003) (providing a brief
look at the status of various countries on the world pharmaceutical scene).
12 See, e.g., America's Other Drug Problem: A Briefing Book on the Rx Drug
Debate, at http://www.citizen.org/documents/dbbapril.pdf (2003) (providing a
comprehensive look at current profits in the pharmaceutical industry).
13 Michele Creech, Make a Run for the Border: Why the U.S. Government
is
Looking to the InternationalMarketfor Affordable PrescriptionDrugs, 15 EMORY
INT'L L. REv. 593, 610 (2001).
14 Id.

'5 See Stanton, supra note 8, at 155 (arguing that the high sunk-costs involved
in developing a new drug, including costs incurred in preparing to bring a product
to market, efficacy studies, regulatory review, and time delays are largely
unrecoverable once spent, unlike other industries).
16 Id. at 154. Stanton also notes how consumer anger likely results from

statistics that, for example, between 1980 and 1992 the average price of inflation
for pharmaceuticals in the United States exceeded the general rate of inflation by
six times. Id.
17See, e.g., Global Medical Forum Summit: Is the U.S. Subsidizing the Global
Pharmaceutical
Market?
A
European
Perspective,
at
http://www.kaisemetwork.org/health-cast/hcast-index.cfm?display=detail&hc= 103
4 (Dec. 5, 2003) (noting that, "it is not uncommon for consumers in Western
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animosity arises from a widely circulating idea that drug companies
will take advantage of every opportunity to charge consumers the
highest possible price.' 8 In 1999, prices for prescription drugs
increased by a record 17.4% over the previous year.' 9 Consequently,
Americans spent $132 billion on prescription drugs in 2000, an
increase of $20.8 billion dollars (18.8%) over 1999.20 At the same
time, while prescription use increased 53% from 1992 to 2000, the
United States population grew by only 10%. 2 1 Nevertheless, the
rising costs of pharmaceuticals may be due to the emerging
preference for using pharmaceuticals instead of 22surgery or long
hospital stays, which used to occur more frequently.
In early 2000, in a drastic response to rising drug prices, the
governors of Vermont and New Hampshire attempted to organize a
coalition of nine states to demand that drug companies drop prices to
Canadian levels or face the reality of being banned outright from the
states' markets. 23 Representing the consumers of their respective
states, the governors pointed out that United States consumers were
paying approximately $116 in Maine for 100 tablets of the arthritis
drug Relafen, while Canadian consumers were paying $59 for the
same drug in Canada. 24 In Maine, the proposal survived legal attacks
by the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America and
was eventually toned-down and became law. 2 5 However, the final
Europe to spend 50% to 65% of what the American consumer spends for the same
medications-often medications that are sold by U.S. companies and even
manufactured in the U.S.").
18 See, e.g., Senate votes to allow drug reimportation from Canada, at

http://www.abcactionnews.com/stories/archive/O30620canadarx.shtml
(June 20,
2003) (noting a provision in a Senate bill allowing citizens to buy prescription
drugs in Canada and penalizing generic drug companies if they enter into deals in
which brand-name competitors pay them to delay bringing the lower-cost
alternative to market).
19 Woodward, supra note 7, at 175.
20

Id.

21 Id.
22

Id.

23

See

at 176.
Drug

Companies:

Prepare to

Be

Philip

http://www.yourdoctorinthefamily.com/commentary/commOl 2.htm

Morrised,

at

(Mar.

29,

Hold,

at

2000).
24

id.

25 See

State

Puts

Maine

Rx

Program

on

http://www.bangornews.com/editorialnews/articles/414351_010504stateputsmainer
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version of the earlier proposal to ban drug companies is currently
ineffective as 26Maine legislators attempt to reconcile it with the
Medicare Act.
Along with consumer animosity, physicians are frequently
becoming irritated with pharmaceutical companies. 27 Physicians
often deal with patients who arrive at their offices with unrealistically
high expectations of drugs the patients see advertised.28 While the
American Medical Association opposed all direct-to-consumer
advertising until 1992, it later softened its stance.29 The Food and
Drug Administration ("FDA") did the same, allowing drug
companies to unleash waves of advertising on the public, often
leaving doctors angry at having to deal with patients' misconstrued
beliefs about the effectiveness of the advertised drugs.3 °
C. The High Price of Pharmaceuticals in the United States
Pharmaceutical manufacturers often argue that large amounts
of capital are needed to produce drugs the public demands. 3 1 During
the early 1990s, the United States government stated that $359
million was needed over the next ten to twelve years to bring a new
drug to market, 32 and such costs continue to rise. 33 A more recent
figure offered by the pharmaceutical industry places the production
figure at $800 million.3 4 On what the money is spent depends upon
x_.cfm (Jan. 5, 2004).
26 Id.

See, e.g., Robert Steyer, Do Drug Ads Educate or Mislead Consumers?, ST.
LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, June 20, 1999, at A9, availableat 1999 WL 3029399.
27

28
29

id.
id.

30

Id.

31

See, e.g., William Davis, The Medicine Equity and Drug Safety Act of 2000:

Releasing Gray Market Pharmaceuticals,9 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 483, 505

(2001).
32

Samantha Shoell, Why Can't the Poor Access Lifesaving Medicines? An

Exploration of Solving the Patent Issue, 4 MINN. INTELL. PROP. REV. 151, 157
(2002).
33 See, e.g., Davis, supra note 31, at 505 (citing statistics that claim the costs
of production were as much as $500 million by 1999).
Spencer Swartz, FDA Big Factor Behind High US Drug Costs,
http://www.forbes.com/home-europe/newswire/2004/01/27/
at
rtr1230471.html (Jan. 27, 2004). Despite those figures, United States drug-price
34 See, e.g.,
ECONOMIST,
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who is asked. Drug companies claim that relentless procedures of
trial and error must occur. 35 New competing drugs, including less
expensive generics, are being introduced much more frequently than
in the past. 36 Drug companies also point to various foreign price
controls, which tend to drive up prices in the United States 37 Also,
the amount of time it takes for the FDA to approve a patent costs the
drug companies valuable sales time. 3 8 Moreover, some argue that tort
pharmaceutical
reform is necessary to lower drug costs by lowering
39
expenses.
liability
of
level
current
companies'
On the other hand, others argue that pharmaceutical
companies' promotional budgets are equivalent to approximately
two-thirds of their spending on research and development ("R&D"). 0
One consumer health organization, Families USA, found that the
"nine U.S. publicly traded companies that market many of the most
popular drugs to seniors spent a total of $45.5 billion on marketing,
advertising and administration, and only $19.1 billion on R&D last
year.",4 1 The resulting dilemma is whether this is a question of how
the accountants manage the books, rather than the result of real

critics say that number is inflated by the high marketing costs of promoting drugs.
Id.
35Stanton, supra note 8,at 157.
36 Id.
37

Id.

38 See, e.g., Holman W. Jenkins, Jr., The Coming Crack-Up in Pharma

Regulation, WALL ST. J., Nov. 12, 2003, at A19 (noting that by the time the FDA
approves a drug for sale, its patent may have partially expired, forcing companies
to price their drugs much higher in order to recoup costs and expected profits
before generics take away potential profits), available at 2003 WL-WSJ 3985392.
See also Drug reimportation bill passes congress despite heated opposition, at
http://www.aapsonline.org/alerts/reimportation.htm (last visited Mar. 15, 2004)
(estimating that about $800 million dollars is added to drug costs by the lengthy
process of drug approval by the FDA).
39 See, e.g., Swartz, supra note 34. Representative Gil Gutknecht, who has

been a significant proponent of reimportation legislation, noted that the same
United States drug liability case costing a company $100 million could be dealt
with in Europe for $100,000. Id.
40 Id. See also Creech, supra note 13, at 607 (putting forth a study by the
Senate Special Committee on Aging that found twenty-two and one half percent of
drug costs were based on promotional and marketing expenses, compared with only
sixteen percent based on actual research and development).
41 Tom Metcalf, Pharmaceutical Companies Spend Lavishly on Doctors, at
http://www.sltrib.com/2003/Aug/08172003/commenta/84602.asp (Aug. 17, 2003).
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manufacturing expenditures. It is notable that the federal government
contributes 55% of the total amount spent on pharmaceutical R&D in
the United States.42 Furthermore, the millions of dollars spent
annually on lobbying Congress just to prevent price controls may be
passed on 43to consumers through elevated costs of the drugs
themselves.
The pricing issue is not black and, white, as both the
proponents of price controls and the pharmaceutical companies
would like consumers to believe. While the United States government
evidently heavily subsidizes the pharmaceutical industry, it must
adjust its pricing schemes to accord with matters outside of its
control.
Proponents of price restrictions argue that pharmaceutical
companies operate in an unregulated market, free to charge whatever
price the market will bear. 4 Those advocates realize the likely effects
price regulations have on all the major pharmaceutical-producing
markets outside of the United States.45 Others argue that high prices
in the U.S. derive from consumers' willingness or ability to pay the
prices in the first place, as opposed to locations outside of the United
States, where income levels often drop significantly.46
The difference in pricing across borders occurs when
companies sell drugs at lower prices in poorer markets.47 Though
likely doubted by many consumers, humanitarianism is often the
48
reason
for suchreason
pricing
techniques.
pricing cited
is a primary
why
the price of Nevertheless,
drugs is at its differential
peak in the

Creech, supra note 13, at 601-02. Interestingly, the money comes from the
National Institute of Health ("NIH"), a taxpayer-funded federal research institute.
As Creech notes, the NIH spent $17.6 billion in taxpayer funds on biomedical R&D
in 2000 alone. Overall, taxpayers fund almost 40 percent of the medical R&D
through the NIH. Id.
41 Id. at 609.
42

Davis, supra note 31, at 502-03.
For one author's perspective on foreign price controls and similar, possible
implementations in the United States, see John A. Vernon, Drug Research and
Price Controls, at http://www.cato.org/pubs/regulation/regv25n4/v25n4-7.pdf
(Winter 2002-03).
44
45

46 See Lowe, supra note 11. In Lowe's June 12, 2003 journal he proposes that
the United States market partially subsidizes R&D costs for the rest of the world, as
a quintessential example of differential pricing by pharmaceutical companies. Id.
47 See Shoell, supra note 32, at 165-66.
48 Id. at 166.
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United States. While price differences allow the pharmaceutical
companies to recover their profits more quickly in the United States
than Canada, they also give importers and distributors the incentive
to bridge the gap in prices across
borders through parallel importing,
49
discussed in the next section.

One of the faults in the concept of price differentials is that,
when applied broadly, it may presume a comparable ability to pay
across populations. Therefore, pharmaceutical companies may
conveniently assume that everyone within a particular region, even
those most in the need of the drugs, can pay for them. Unfortunately,
United States consumers most in need of the drugs are often portions
of the elderly population, who frequently do not fit this
presumption. 5
D. Parallel Imports
As previously mentioned, while prices remain exorbitantly
high in the United States, prices of pharmaceuticals are considerably
lower in Canada. This situation has prompted many Americans to
cross the border to buy medicine 52 or to simply purchase it via the
Internet. 53 The situation has also prompted an assortment of lawsuits
as an attempt to prevent reimportation of the drugs. 54 Reimporting
49 Id. at 167.
50 Id.

51 See, e.g., State to crack down on Canadian prescription ordering, at

http://www.abcactionnews.com/stories/2003/06/03061 lcanadarx.shtml (June 11,
2003) (discussing the case of an elderly woman in Florida lamenting over her
possible inability to pay $600 a month for the rising costs of drugs in her
hometown).
52 See

Cross-Border

Shopping,

at

http://www.tompaine.com/

feature2.cfn/ID/8451 (July 24, 2003) (reciting the story of common bus trips
leaving from Maine to Canada in the earlier morning hours with seniors "clutching
prescriptions").
53 Countless distributors can be easily accessed by simply running a search on
any search engine. For example, on Jan. 9, 2004, the author conducted a search on
http://www.google.com using the key words "Canadian pharmaceuticals," which
yielded results such as "canadadrugs.com,"
"candrugstore.com,"
and
"getcanadiandrugs.com."
54 See,

e.g.,

Leonard

Zehr,

U.S.

Warns

Net

Drug

Firm,

at

http://www.globeinvestor.comlservlet/ArticleNewsstory/GAM/20030910/RDRUG
10 (Sept. 10, 2003) (discussing a recent suit by the Department of Justice ("DOJ")
against the largest importer of Canadian drugs into the United States). See also
discussion infra Part IV.B.
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United States drugs back from Canada is also known as "parallel
importing," which is simply the resale of foreign-purchased goods
back into their original place of manufacture.,- The phenomenon
exists principally because goods of the same character are valued
differently in different markets. Since international trade barriers are
rapidly diminishing, 56 importers are then able to turn profits by
simply purchasing drugs abroad and then reimporting them for sale.
Parallel importing exists between Canada and the United States
because Canada regulates the prices of pharmaceuticals and the
United States does not. 57 This framework allows drugs to be sold at a
lower price in Canada than in the United States. Given that the
United States-Canadian border is both enormous and rather porous,
importers interested in turning a profit face few obstacles.
While parallel importing is the act involved, the goods
themselves are termed "gray market" goods, which are not illegal
themselves, but their means of distribution are unauthorized.58 In
theory, gray marketing should have the effect of lowering the price in
the market where prices are higher by the redistribution in that
market of the same goods at a lower price.59 The effect in the market
from which goods are drawn will either be a lowering
or raising of
60
the price, depending upon how the market responds.

Davis, supra note 31, at 489.
56 A. Bryan Baer, Price Controls Through the Back Door: The Parallel
Importationof Pharmaceuticals,9 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 109, 111 (2001).
57 Stanton, supra note 8, at 160. Canada's most important step was the
creation of the Patented Medicines Price Review Board ("PMPRB") in 1987, which
has the power to compel manufacturers to disclose confidential information
concerning their drug pricing. Failure to comply with information requests and
pricing mandates from the PMPRB could initially lead to the invalidation of the
drug's patent. The PMPRB's power was later reduced to the imposition of financial
penalties. Id. at 160-61.
58 Shubha Ghosh, Pills, Patents, and Power: State Creation of Gray Markets
as a Limit on PatentRights, 53 FLA. L. REv. 789, 790 (2001).
55

9 Id. at 802.
60 Id. As Ghosh explains, while there may be an upward pressure on the price
to respond to the demand of the gray marketer, there may also be downward
pressure from the global equalization of prices. Id. The issue is much more
complex than what this author presents, but this should simply be considered a
brief outline on the economic forces at play in the reimportation of pharmaceuticals
into the United States from Canada.
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E. Federal Responses to Calls for Legislation
Whether the pharmaceutical companies or consumers are
correct in their respective interpretations of the current prices,
Congress responded to the consumer outrage over pharmaceutical
prices. Unlike Canada, which chose to create a body of government
to specifically regulate its pharmaceutical industry, 61 the United
States has never chosen to take this step. Instead, Congress passed
less intrusive regulations, such as the Prescription Drug Marketing
Act of 1987 ("PDMA").62
Without completely prohibiting the general importation of
FDA-approved drugs into the United States, the PDMA completely
banned parallel imports, unless the manufacturer imported the drugs
on its own. 63 The stated concern of the Act was to protect the health
and safety of consumers in the United States. 64 However, the PDMA
also contained an exception for consumers purchasing drugs for
personal use only,6 5 allowing them to circumvent a blanket ban on
parallel importing.
Due to continued pressure on Congress to make
pharmaceuticals more affordable, Congress passed the Medicine
Equity and Drug Safety Act of 2000 ("MEDSA").66 Prior to passing
MEDSA, Congress struggled with the idea of providing affordable
drugs through means other than price controls. 67 The idea of
61

See Stanton, supra note 8, at 160.

62

Prescription Drug Marketing Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-293, 102 Stat. 95

(1987).
63

Id.

6' Id.

See

also

113

The

Prescription Drug

Marketing

Act,

at

http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foia reading-room/usam/title4/civO 13.htm
(Nov. 1998). Expanding upon the supposed health hazards, the DOJ employs
language that calls parallel importing "the multi-million dollar drug diversion
market that provides a portal through which mislabeled, subpotent, adulterated,
expired, and counterfeit drugs are able to enter the nation's drug distribution
system." Id.
65 Prescription Drug Marketing Act § 3. Specifically, the PDMA allowed

consumers to purchase prescription drugs, including those drugs not even approved
by the FDA, in Mexico and Canada, as long as they were for personal use and did
not pose any serious health hazard. § 5.
66 Medicine Equity and Drug Safety Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-387, 114

Stat. 1549 (2000).
67 See, e.g., Laurie Puhn, Are Gray Goods the Solution to the Rising Prices
of
Prescription Drugs?, at http://www.cafezine.com/index-article.asp?deptid=
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reimporting pharmaceuticals gained ground as a less drastic
alternative to a clear attempt at price regulation. 68 A bill proposing
the International Drug Parity Act of 1999 ("IDPA") was introduced
into Congress but not signed into law, despite being tremendously
appealing. 69 The IDPA received a great deal of support initially
because many thought it would force the United States-Canadian
pharmaceutical market to expand, and therefore, allow greater
accessibility to cheaper drugs for United States citizens.7°
Although it was not made law, the IDPA planted the seeds for
MEDSA, which allowed pharmacists and wholesalers to reimport
American-made, FDA-approved drugs into the United States.7 by
amending Chapter VIII of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act
("FDCA"). 72 The express intent of MEDSA was to encourage the
resale of foreign-purchased drugs in the United States.73 MEDSA
also repealed provisions of the PDMA,74 which previously allowed
only for the reimportation of pharmaceuticals by manufacturers
regulated by the FDA.75 In fact, MEDSA originated in the House of
Representatives as did the IDPA proposal. 76 The version of MEDSA
that later passed through the Senate in 2000 was modified only
slightly, despite IDPA's rejection in 1999. 77 While these new
measures for controlling prices were not dramatic by any means,
neither being a great victory for angry consumers nor for the
pharmaceutical companies, Congress opened the door slightly to
4&Id=662 (Jan. 23, 2003).
68 See, e.g., Michael Moore, A Call for the Establishment in the U.S. of a
PrescriptionDrug Price RegulatoryAgency, 1 Sw. J. L. & TRADE AM. 149 (1994)
(providing an in-depth look at one advocate's proposal for a pricing regulatory
agency).
69 Creech, supra note 13, at 627.
70 See, e.g., The Bitter Pill: A New Look at Remedies that Make Prescription
to
the
Americans
Who
Need
Them,
at
Drugs Affordable
http://johnson.senate.gov/drugflip/Bitter%20Pil.allpages.pdf (Sept. 1999).
71 Medicine Equity and Drug Safety Act § 804.
72

§ 3.

73

§ 2.

74

§ 745.

75 Prescription Drug Marketing Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-293, § 3, 102

Stat. 95 (1987).
76 Creech, supra note 13, at 628.
77

id.
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price controls by virtue of their enactment.
Although President William J. Clinton chose to sign MEDSA
into law, neither Secretary of Health and Human Services, Donna
Shalala, nor her successor, Tommy Thompson, took steps to
promulgate the regulations permitted by MEDSA.78 MEDSA gave
the Secretary of Health and Human Services the power to promulgate
the regulations that would implement the law, essentially leaving the
fate of the law in the Secretary's hands.79 Secretary Thompson's
written reasons for rejecting MEDSA focus principally on safety
concerns and insecurities towards the reimportation of American
drugs across the nation's borders. 80 Secretary Shalala refused to
authorize the reimportation of pharmaceuticals for similar reasons,
citing fears that parallel imports would not meet United States safety
standards. 8 Additionally, others raised concerns over the actual
effectiveness of the Act due to supposed last-minute loopholes that
82
pharmaceutical lobbyists slipped in through heavy investments.
Other concerns included: (1) labeling requirements that gave
pharmaceutical companies too much control over reimportation; (2) a
five-year sunset provision that gave little incentive to companies to
reimport drugs; (3) the fact that United States drug companies could
still insert provisions in contracts with foreign companies forcing
them to sell drugs back into the United
States at high prices; and (4)
83
Act.
the
of
funding
the insufficient
78

See Puhn, supra note 67.

79 Medicine Equity and Drug Safety Act § 745.
80

See, e.g, Tommy Thompson, U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Services

Response

to

Sen.

James

Jeffords

on

Drug

Reimportation,

at

http://www.fda.gov/oc/po/thompson/medsact.html (July 9, 2001). Interestingly,
Senator Jim Jeffords was the original proponent of MEDSA in 2000, only to have
his previous efforts denied by Secretary Shalala as well. See Creech, supra note 13,
at 628.
81 Ghosh, supra note 58, at 794. As Ghosh also notes, Secretary Shalala's
response was controversial, considering the Clinton administration received
considerable support from pharmaceutical companies during his previous
campaign. Id. See also Robert Pear, In a Turnaround, White House Kills DrugImport Plan, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 27, 2000, at Al (listing additional reasons for
Secretary Shalala's response, including MEDSA's ultimate inability to save money
for consumers).
82 Creech, supra note 13, at 635. Citing an editorial written by Representative
Bernard Sanders, Creech puts forth evidence that lobbyists contributed $9 million
to legislators just to fight implementation of MEDSA. Id.
83 Id. at 635-37. Concerning the insufficient funding of MEDSA, while
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With MEDSA in limbo, and no comprehensive response
provided on the issue, the House proposed the PMAA in a lastminute piece of legislation during July 2003.84 If made law, the
PMAA would amend the FDCA, 85 just as MEDSA had attempted.
The PMAA begins by listing the following congressional findings:
(1) "Americans unjustly pay up to 1000 percent more to fill their
prescriptions than consumers in other countries;" (2) "It]he United
States is the world's largest market for pharmaceuticals yet
consumers still pay the world's highest prices;" and (3) "[a]llowing
and structuring the importation of prescription drugs ensures access
to affordable drugs, thus providing a level of safety to American
consumers they do not currently enjoy." 86 But, similar to previous
proposals, the PMAA is also inconclusive and awaits a response from
the Senate, which is unlikely to happen because the Medicare Act has
become law. 87 Assuming the PMAA does somehow materialize,
however,
Secretary Thompson will have to be convinced of its
88
worth.
Aside from the PMAA, the most recent attempt to provide
relief to the American public over this issue is the Medicare Act.89
This legislation also amends the FDCA 90 and seeks solutions by
modifying similar previous attempts, rather than providing novel
solutions altogether. While this Act does not address the
reimportation issue as the PMAA does, it leaves the ultimate decision
in the hands of the Secretary of Health and Human Services to
"promulgate regulations permitting pharmacists and wholesalers to
Congress appropriated almost $24 million to establish a monitoring system for
reimportation, the FDA estimated it would take at least $ 90 million to get it off the
ground. Id. at 637.
84 Pharmaceutical Market Access Act of 2003, H.R. 2427, 108th Cong. §
505B (2003).
85

§4.

86

§ 2.

87

Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003,

Pub L. No. 108-173, 117 Stat. 2066 (2003).
88 Like previous acts, the PMAA gives the Secretary of Health and Human
Services the power to promulgate regulations for the reimportation of prescription
drugs. See Pharmaceutical Market Access Act of 2003, H.R. 2427, 108th Cong. §
505B (2003) (preamble to bill).
89 Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization
Act of 2003,
Pub L. No. 108-173, 117 Stat. 2066 (2003).
90 § 1121.
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import prescription drugs from Canada into the United States." 91 As
Secretary Thompson previously noted, the concerns over
reimportation center on safety. Therefore, the Medicare Act contains
a number of clauses by which importers must abide when bringing
drugs back across the border from Canada. 92 The clauses help to
appease some concerns over safety, but will not be enough to prevent
pharmaceutical companies or the FDA from attacking
this legislation
93
for not offering enough protection to consumers.

III. Purposes of the PMAA and Medicare Act
A. Attacking the High Price of Pharmaceuticals
One of the primary objectives of the PMAA was to make a
substantial dent in the cost of pharmaceuticals for American
consumers. 94 Section Three of the PMAA boldly sets forth Congress'
views of the current pricing issues, stating that the Act's purpose is
to: (1) "give all Americans immediate relief from the outrageously
high cost of pharmaceuticals;" and (2) "reverse the perverse
economics of the American pharmaceutical markets., 95 However, the
Act is estimated to reduce total prescription drug expenditures in the
United States by only about 1%, or $40 billion, between the 2004 and
2013 period. 96 These numbers will result primarily from the
reimportation of brand-name drugs that are protected by patents in
the United States.97 Though the PMAA uses forceful, provocative
language to state its purpose, it implements these objectives by

91 Id.

Id. Section 1121(d), in revising Section 804(d) of Chapter VIII of the
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act ("FDCA"), specifically provides numerous
clauses by which importers must comply in bringing drugs across the border. §
1121(d).
93 See discussion infra Part III.B.
92

94 CongressionalBudget Office Cost Estimate, H.R. 2427 The Pharmaceutical
Market
Access
Act
of
2003,
available
at
http://www.cbo.gov/showdoc.cfm?index=4852&sequence=0
(Nov. 19, 2003)
[hereinafter CBO Cost Estimate].
95
96

Pharmaceutical Market Access Act § 3.
See CBO Cost Estimate, supra note 94.

97 Id.

Loyola Consumer Law Review

[Vol. 16: 3

simply re-wording select sections of the FDCA. 98 The amendments to
the present law also are ineffective; they simply pass the burden on to
the Secretary of
the Health and Human Services to come up with his
99
own solutions.
The main goal of the Medicare Act is to lower consumers'
payments for pharmaceuticals by employing a Medicare outpatient
prescription drug benefit for seniors, providing prescription drug
coverage starting in 2006, and offering a Medicare drug discount
card.' ° However, the law focuses little on lifting restrictions on the
importation of less expensive drugs from Canada and other
countries.101 This issue initially appears as a marked difference
between the Medicare Act's proposed solutions and those of the
PMAA, which focus directly on reimportation issues. The Medicare
Act simply amends the FDCA to direct the Secretary of Health and
Human Services to promulgate regulations permitting pharmacists,
wholesalers, and individuals to import prescription drugs from
10 2
Canada into the United States, just as the PMAA attempts to do.
Consequently, the Medicare Act does address the pricing issue to
some extent, but the focus of its efforts is largely directed towards
alleviating medical expenses by other means. In addition, the
importation clauses in the Medicare Act exist
subject to the will of
03
the Secretary of Health and Human Services.'
Despite being criticized for its feeble attempt to lower prices
by catering to pharmaceutical companies, and preserving the exact
pricing structures that already exist, President Bush called the
Medicare Act the "greatest advance in health care coverage for
America's seniors since the founding of Medicare.' 0 4 But, while the
98

Pharmaceutical Market Access Act § 4.

99 Id. Section 4 amends the FDCA by directing the Secretary of Health and
Human Services to promulgate regulations allowing qualifying individuals to

import specific pharmaceuticals. § 4.
100

See David E. Rosenbaum, Bush Signs Law to Cover Drugsfor the Elderly,

N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 9, 2003, at Al, A18.
101Id.
102Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of

2003, Pub L. No. 108-173, §1121, 117 Stat. 2066 (2003).
103 Id. Section 1121, the reimportation section, "shall become effective only if
the Secretary certifies to Congress that its implementation will: (A) pose no
additional risk to the public's health and safety; and (B) result in a significant
reduction in the cost of covered products to the American consumer." § 1121(l)(1).
104 See Rosenbaum, supra note 100, at A18.
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Medicare Act is held out by some as a great reform of the Medicare
system, the Act prohibits the Medicare Administration from
negotiating with pharmaceutical companies to obtain the lowest
possible cost for drugs. 10 5 Those searching for legislation that would
bring a dramatic slash in drug prices were disappointed, but some of
those same people nonetheless supported the legislation's limited
Act will lower
attempts at cost control. 10 6 Whether the Medicare
10 7
prices for consumers will remain to be seen.
B. Safety of Reimported Drugs
One of the central issues in reimportation legislation is the
safety of drugs coming across the border, the FDA's primary
Still, the FDA has come under fire recently from
concern.'
legislators and the public with accusations that it is providing
misleading information to protect pharmaceutical companies from
reimportation.1 9 In a May 28, 2003 memorandum from the
Congressional Research Service ("CRS"), a nonpartisan body relied
upon by the House and the Senate to provide accurate research, 0 to
See Edward I. Koch, Prescription Drug Plan Needs Amending, at
(Dec. 20,
http://www.newsmax.com/archives/arficles/2003/12/19/163838.shtml
2003).
106 Id. For instance, the American Association of Retired Persons ("AARP")
105

supported the Medicare Act. Although it supported reimportation from Canada, the
AARP said that despite a number of flaws, "a limited federal drug prescription
program is a good start that could be improved over time." Id.
107

See id.

108The FDA's web site posts links such as the following: "Safety concerns of
imported drugs;" "Warning: Don't buy these 10 drugs from imported sources;" and
http://www.fda.gov/oc/opacom/
See
be
deceiving."
can
"Looks
hottopics/importdrugs/default.htm (last visited Mar. 15, 2004).
109 See, e.g., Tony Pugh, FDA Admits It's Seen No Bad Drugs From Canada,
at http://timesargus.com/Story75l85.html (Nov. 27, 2003) (citing figures that FDA
officials cannot name a single American who's been injured or killed by drugs
bought from licensed Canadian pharmacies). Representative Dan Burton also
recently stated, "I had four hearings and I asked (FDA Associate Commissioner
William Hubbard) to give me examples where people have been damaged by
Canadian pharmaceuticals and re-importation, and he couldn't even give me one,
not one." Id.
110Memorandum from Blanchard Randall IV and Donna Vogt of Domestic
Social Policy Division to Honorable Bernard Sanders (May 28, 2003) (on file with
the Congressional Research Service), at http://bernie.house.gov/documents/CRSCanadianRxDrugs.pdf.
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Representative Bernard Sanders of Vermont, the CRS stated that both
the United States and Canada "mandate strict quality controls, testing
standards, and thorough inspections to ensure the safety and efficacy
of prescription drugs.""' Also, in an agreement of cooperation
between the FDA and the Canadian Department of National Health
and Welfare, FDA Commissioner, Mark B. McClellan, noted that
"... it is in no small measure because of this cooperation [between the

United States and Canada] that drugs marketed in Canada and the
U.S. are as safe and efficacious as modem science and technology
will permit."' 12 Such a statement flies in the face of what the FDA is
currently promoting with its campaign of safety against
reimportation.
The PMAA addresses the issue of safety, putting forth
measures for counterfeit-resistant technologies and strict standards
for packaging and labeling. 113 The Act also provides that the importer
of any specific drug provide the Secretary of Health and Human
Services with information and records regarding the name and
amount of the active ingredient, the date and quantity of shipment,
points of origin and destination, the prices paid and charged by the
importer, and the manufacturer's lot or control number for the
product." 4 The PMAA attempts to deal with safety issues while still
alleviating price differentials between the United States and Canada.
These measures make the PMAA markedly different from the 1987
PDMA, implemented primarily for the purpose of preventing broad
reimportation practices because of safety concerns.
Though the Medicare Act is not preoccupied with
reimportation issues, it does lift the supposed ban on drug
reimportation from Canada, albeit dependent on the certification of
product safety by Secretary Thompson." 6 The Secretary of Health
and Human Services is given significant authority, including the
power to approve state-run pilot programs for reimportation of drugs
111 Id.
112 Id.
113

Pharmaceutical Market Access Act of 2003, H.R. 2427, 108th Cong. §§ 4-

5 (2003).
114

§4.
15 Davis, supra note 31, at 486. As mentioned earlier, the 1987
PDMA
expressly banned the reimportation of pharmaceuticals manufactured in the United
States and sold abroad by anyone other than the drug maker itself. Id.
116 Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of
2003, Pub. L. No. 108-73, § 1121, 117 Stat. 2066 (2003).
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from Canada. 1 7 The Medicare Act also uses security measures
similar to the PMAA that require importers to submit to the Secretary
a wealth of information about the products being moved across the
border." Interestingly, despite the continued animosity towards
Canadian reimportation schemes, forces are aligning against the law,
claiming that they will not abide by any attempts the Medicare Act
makes in preventing reimportation." 9 It remains to be seen how
Secretary Thompson will wield his new-found power under the
Medicare Act and how he, and possibly others in the Department of
Justice ("DOJ"), will choose to respond.

IV. Reactions and Results of the PMAA and Medicare
Act
A. Continuing Concerns
MEDSA is now meaningless, and it appears as if the House's
PMAA is also well on its way to obscurity because the Medicare Act
has become law. While the Medicare Act purports to provide relief to
consumers for prescription drugs, initial indications quote a hefty
price for the measure, amounting to an estimated $395 billion over
2 As if that figure is not large enough,
the 2004 to made
2013 more
period."
predictions
recently
by the Bush administration now

117

Id. See also, e.g., Letter from Governor Blagojevich of Illinois to Secretary

Thompson,
at
http://www.house.gov/apps/list/press/i05_emanuel/
thompsonjrequest.pdf (Dec. 22, 2003). In addition to recognizing Secretary
Thompson's authority to certify the Medicare Act, Governor Rod Blagojevich is
currently seeking further reimportation consent.
118 § 1121. The Medicare Act provides that importers must give the Secretary
lab records and documentation listing every entity through which the drugs passes
and prove that the quantities are equal upon every exchange. Id.
"9 See Koch, supra note 105. Both the City of Boston and the State of New
Hampshire have indicated that they intend to import American drugs from Canada,
despite the Medicare Act. Id.
120 Letter
to Honorable Ted Stevens, Chairman of Committee on

Appropriations (Nov. 20, 2003) (on file with the Congressional Budget Office),
available at http://ftp.cbo.gov/48xx/doc4853/11-20-MedicareLetter3.pdf. See also
Medicare
Follow-up?,
at
http://www.centristpolicynetwork.org/

archives/000047.html (Jan. 4, 2004) (quoting Congressional Budget Office
("CBO") Director, Douglas Holtz-Eakin, who stated that the cost could swell to $12 trillion over the following 10 years) [hereinafter Medicare Follow-up].
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estimate the price to be $530 billion, a difference of $135 billion.' 2 1
The Act also suffers from its use of confusing terms, even leading
some of the law's proponents to misread some provisions or disagree
about what it actually contains.' 22 United States consumers are
calling not just for a comprehensive response to their demands for
low-priced pharmaceuticals, but something that is understandable and
capable of providing immediate results. The Medicare Act fulfills
neither of those expectations. With the exception of the availability of
the Medicare Drug Discount Card, which will be distributed upon
proper application during the spring of 2004,123 pricing relief will not
become wholly effective until 2006, at which point consumers will
likely be fed up with the law's confusing provisions.
Since the federal government will contract with private
companies to offer these discount cards,' 24 drug companies will have
the ability to modify discounts at will. 125 In fact, private companies
issuing)the cards are able to raise or lower the discounts on a weekly
basis."' However, once consumers sign up for a particular card, they
are required to keep that card for an entire year. 127 Although the
Department of Health and Human Services estimates savings of
approximately ten to fifteen percent on drug Costs, 128 the figures vary
widely across population centers,1 29 providing a form of relief to
some but hardly any to others. Also, not every pharmacy will have to
Robert Pear, Bush's Aides Put Higher Price Tag on Medicare Law, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 30, 2004, at Al. While the Bush administration quoted this new figure,
the CBO concurrently maintained the cost will be about $400 billion. Id.
122 See
Medicare
Rx
Plan
Confuses
Seniors,
at
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/12/08/politics/main587236.shtml (Dec. 22,
2003).
123 See HHS Announces Immediate Steps to Make Medicare-Approved Drug
Discount
Card
Programs
Available
Next
Spring,
at
http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2003pres/20031210a.html
(Dec.
10,
2003)
[hereinafter HHS Announcement].
124 id.
121

125 See Medicare PrescriptionDrug Discount Cards: What You Should Know,
at http://www.medicarerights.org/rxcards faq.html (last modified Jan. 6, 2004)
[hereinafter Medicare Discount Cards].
126 See Judith Graham, Drug cards may triggerheadaches, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 8,

2004, § 1, at 1, availableat 2004 WL 72751545.
127

Id.

128

See HHS Announcement, supra note 123.

129

See Medicare Discount Cards, supra note 125.
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honor the cards, but may instead choose to honor alternative cards
available through Medicare private plans or other private
organizations. 130 Individual states also offer their own card programs,
which seniors will have to compare to the Medicare card system1 3 to
1
determine which offers the greater savings on any particular drug.
Because of mail-order pharmacies, especially those
distributing drugs from Canada, it is hard to believe that seniors will
jump on the discount card bandwagon, especially because discount
cards are already available through other sources. The pervasive
theme that will continue to haunt legislators is that consumers, most
of whom are seniors, recognize that, instead of settling for
compromise legislation in the United States, they can continue to
purchase their drugs from Canada at lower prices.
While the Medicare Act wiggles its way around the
reimportation issue, the PMAA confronts the issue head on. The
PMAA expressly recognizes the exorbitant prices that consumers are
paying, especially in comparison to prices in Canada.' 32 Although it
does not function now, and presumably will never be law, the PMAA
remains a significant, concerted attempt by Congress to address the
reimportation issue directly instead of subtly skirting around it by
modifying provisions hidden away in other legislation. The PMAA's
attempts to address reimportation will likely be seen again in the
future because the Medicare Act does not address the issue to the
extent that consumers are demanding.
B. A Backlash from the FDA and Pharmaceutical Concerns
Recent federal lawsuits and other actions by pharmaceutical
companies make the reimportation issue even more pressing, proving
that a comprehensive response is needed soon. In September 2003,
the DOJ warned the largest chain of Internet stores dealing with
Canadian pharmacies to close immediately or face a government
lawsuit. 133 The FDA, saying it "uncovered a 'disturbing pattern of
actions by these companies resulting in potentially hazardous
34
errors,"' prompted the DOJ to bring the lawsuit against Rx Depot.'
130 id.
131

Id.

132

Pharmaceutical Market Access Act of 2003, H.R. 2427, 108th Cong. § 2

(2003).
133

Zehr, supra note 54.

134 id.
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The DOJ first filed the lawsuit against the growing sector of Internet
pharmaceutical distributors that assist United States consumers in
obtaining Canadian drugs.' 35 Following a district court ruling that Rx
Depot was violating laws because only drug manufacturers may take
their products across the national boundary, 36 Rx Depot's motion to
stay the preliminary injunction pending its appeal was denied,
effectively closing down the distributor. 137
During the same period, while also citing safety concerns and
a secure supply of drugs for Canadians, Pfizer joined
GlaxoSmithKline ("Glaxo"), AstraZeneca, and Wyeth in blacklisting
Internet pharmacies in Canada that sell their medicines to United
States consumers. 138 In early August 2003, Pfizer sent letters to fortysix Canadian pharmacies demanding they make direct purchases of
medicines from Pfizer and no longer from wholesalers. 139 Pfizer had
been monitoring reimportation practices and found that the
pharmacies were conducting a substantial amount of sales to people
in the United States. 140 Incidentally, in January 2003, Glaxo also said
it would not sell drugs to Canadian pharmacies that sold drugs to
United States residents. 14 1 AstraZeneca and Wyeth later said they
would investigate uncommonly large orders from Canadian
142
pharmacies to ensure they were not participating in reimportation.
The lawsuit and the drug companies' actions, coming in the
wake of the PMAA and roughly during the same period as the
organization of the Medicare Act, are forceful statements against
Congressional steps towards easing reimportation procedures. The
judicial system cannot be expected to deal with more litigation
United States v. Rx Depot, 290 F. Supp. 2d 1238 (N.D. Okla. 2003). See
also Zehr, supra note 53. As Zehr notes, Rx Depot also represents a significant
escalation of the FDA's battle to discourage imports from Canada. Id.
136 Rx Depot, 290 F. Supp. 2d at 1246.
137 United States v. Rx Depot, 297 F. Supp. 2d 1306, 1311 (N.D. Okla. 2003).
135

See also James Bernstein, Ruling Upheld vs. Rx Depot, NEWSDAY, Nov. 27, 2003,
at A65.
138 Zehr, supra note 54.
139

See Trade Group Representing Canadian PharmaciesSays It Might File

Lawsuit
in
Response
to
Pfizer
Restrictions,
at
http://www.kaisernetwork.org/daily-reports/rep-hpolicy-recent-rep.cfm?drcat=3
&show=yes&drDateTime=08-08-03 (Aug. 8, 2003).
140

id.

141

Id.

142

Id.
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concerning who is right and who is wrong. Courts should not be the
forums responsible for interpreting what amounts to an amalgamation
of confusing legislation. Rather, Congress will again have to provide
a response to those who will continue to purchase reimported drugs
from Canada, despite the attempts in the Medicare Act to reduce
prescription drug costs.
C. Alternative Solutions
As an alternative solution to the PMAA and Medicare Act,
some argue for direct, government-regulated pricing schemes, which
exist in most other major markets. 143 That would likely mean
sacrificing some level of productivity in the R&D departments of the
drug companies, as pricing schemes would translate into lost profits.
There are serious doubts that many people would be willing to
sacrifice R&D developments for savings on pharmaceuticals. That is,
what is the advantage in lobbying for lower-priced pharmaceuticals
when the ultimate result may be the loss of the pharmaceuticals
altogether?
However, when a greater part of the pharmaceutical's budget
is actually spent on marketing than on R&D, 144 arguments against
price regulations lose their strength. Drug companies should be
rewarded for their innovative products. However, when companies
such as Glaxo & Pfizer blacklist Internet drug companies, citing
safety concerns and a secure supply of drugs for Canadians, 145 it is
difficult to find these explanations anything but attempts at humor.
Neither Glaxo, nor Pfizer, nor any other pharmaceutical company in
the United States wants reimportation to continue because they know
it spells lost profits for them regardless of possible harmful effects for
drug-buying Canadians.
Nonetheless, these companies should not be blamed entirely
for high prices. The problem exists on two levels: (1) United States
drug companies are completely unregulated and focus entirely too
much of their financial resources on marketing as opposed to R&D;
and (2) approval times for drugs are notoriously long, using up
precious time for each drug's patent. Every minute the FDA spends
in reviewing the drug applications translates into a higher-priced

143See Vernon, supra note 45.
"44 See Metcalf, supra note 41.
145 See discussion supra Part IV.B.
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46
pharmaceutical upon its introduction into the market.1
Redistribution of capital from marketing to R&D would likely
translate into more successful drugs and mean more profit-making
products for the companies, as well as more remedies for American
consumers. Of course, others may argue that profits raised due to
marketing could similarly be reinvested in R&D, yielding the same
result: more helpful drugs on the market. Also, in the absence of price
regulation, drug companies have no incentive to reduce prices. They
will continue to charge high prices in the United States because doing
anything less would mean harm to their profits. 147
One other radical solution proposes placing control of drug
research directly in the hands of the government. 148 However, if
implemented, it is hard to believe that pharmaceutical innovations
would keep pace with the rate at which production currently exists in
the United States. This solution, again, would likely mean sacrificing
potential benefits from drugs for the sake of savings on their sales.
A somewhat similar creative proposal advocates dividing
pharmaceutical research and production into two elements: R&D and
pill production. 149 This solution would allow the government to
purchase drug patents from the pharmaceutical companies, then make
massive awards to the companies for their R&D.' 5° Subsequently, use
of the patents would be freely offered to any firms wishing to
produce the pills.151 This approach would ensure active competition
among generic producers and create low prices, as competition forces

146

See, e.g., Swartz, supra note 34

(explaining his theory about the high cost

of drugs, Nobel laureate Milton Friedman stated that the FDA is the most serious
problem regarding the high costs of prescription drugs in the United States because,
while its task involves extreme care, the time expended for such care is precisely at
the heart of the pricing problem).
147 See Creech, supra note 13, at 597.
148

See Jeff Lemieux, Socializing Drug Development Costs After FDA

http://www.centrists.org/
Feasible,
at
is Not
Approval
pages/2003/08/22_lemieuxhealth.html (Aug. 23, 2003) (explaining the potential
detrimental effects on drug innovation by allowing the government to control
research and development).
149 See Burton A. Weisbrod, Solving the Drug Dilemma, WASH. POST, Aug.
22, 2003, at A21, available at 2003 WL 62209778. Professor Weisbrod also
acknowledges that reimportation, if permitted to a greater degree than it currently
is, will inevitably be a short-term solution to the drug pricing problem. Id.
150

id.

151

id.

2004]

Congress' Approach to Affordable Pharmaceuticals

243

prices down toward their production costs. 152 Critics of the approach
point to the inevitable difficulty of calculating reasonable awards to
drug companies for their R&D and the likelihood that other markets
will simply lower theirprices as well to complement price reductions
in the United States.15 The idea, despite its novel approach to the
problem, gives the government too much control over the
pharmaceutical market to ever seriously be considered in the United
States. Any measures nearing the magnitude of government control
advocated by this approach could only occur after significant reforms
in the current legislative system. Specifically, considering the amount
of lobbying in which pharmaceutical companies already engage, the
reaction by the pharmaceutical companies to such a proposal would
immediately crush the idea. Only by reforming lobbying practices in
Congress would the idea stand any chance at survival because this
approach would effectively end pharmaceutical companies' drug
monopolies.

V. No Relief in Sight
The Medicare Act's long-term impact will be difficult to
decipher, particularly due to its dormant period, which provides that
no drug coverage will be available until 2006. 154 From that
perspective, it is hard to imagine angry consumers patiently waiting
for 2006 instead of pursuing their calls for reform. This is especially
apparent due to the fact that consumption of pharmaceuticals and
prices paid for them are both expected to continue rising.155 Judging
from concerns over confusion156 and the fact that the Medicare Act
simply expands upon existing solutions in providing a response to
152

id.

e.g., Lemieux, supra note 148 (providing a critical response to
Professor Weisbrod's approach for decreasing drug prices in the United States).
154 Rosenbaum, supra note 100, at A18.
153 See,

See Douglas Holtz-Eakin & Jeff Lemieux, The Cost of Medicare: What the
Future Holds, at http://www.heritage.org/Research/HealthCare/HL815.cfm (Dec.
15, 2003). Reprinted in the article is an interview with CBO Director Holtz-Eakin,
who stated that Medicare-aged individuals are expected to spend $1.8 trillion on
prescription drugs during the 10-year window between 2004 and 2013. The number
is expected to grow rapidly, already growing at a rate of about nine percent per
155

year. Id.
156 See, e.g., Medicare Follow-up, supra note 120 (stating that the Medicare

Act "may be the least understood major piece of health care legislation Congress
has ever passed").
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pharmaceutical prices, it also seems unlikely that consumers will be
satisfied with discount cards, which only provide limited relief at the
will of private corporations.
While those on opposing sides of the political spectrum
offered predictable reactions,1 57 a current survey of opinions about
15 8
the Medicare Act yields results that are broad and often inaccurate.
This may suggest that most Americans are not yet sure about what
the impact of the Act will be. Though pharmaceutical prices may in
fact be lowered in certain cases, those who have become embittered
over the years at pharmaceutical companies will not appreciate the
fact that those companies are not lowering their own prices, but
appear to have more liberty to set Medicare terms, and in the process,
receive relief from the federal government in pricing measures paid
for by United States taxpayers. In other words, while the Medicare
Act uses contributions by the federal government to lower prices, the
government will be paying for the reduced costs through taxes
coming out of consumers' pockets.
When the terms of the Medicare Act become clear, likely
before its real effects begin to take place, Congress will find itself
back at the drawing board, attempting to come up with another
solution to the problem of pharmaceutical prices in the United States.
In fact, the day after President Bush signed the Medicare Act into
law, senators had already introduced a bill that, if made law, would
repeal the Medicare Act.15 9 Unless steps towards parity with pricing
schemes in Canada are taken through congressional legislation,
maneuvering by pharmaceutical companies to cut off supplies to the
Canadian market, or a balancing of the price differentials that
currently exist by other market forces, there are serious doubts that
this issue will become any more conclusive. In all likelihood,
157

See, e.g., David Thibault, Dem Presidential Candidates Hammered for

Missing Medicare Vote, at http://www.crosswalk.com/news/1233207.html (Nov.

26, 2003) (explaining the filibuster attempts by Senators Edward Kennedy, John
Kerry, and Joe Lieberman to defeat the Medicare Act). See also, e.g., George W.
1,
at
H.R.
on
President
by
Statement
Bush,

http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/12/20031208-11 .html (last visited
Mar. 15, 2004) (noting President Bush's support for the law).
158 See, e.g., Holtz-Eakin & Lemieux, supra note 155 (calling the Act "the
Rorschach test for the future of health care policy in the United States"). The
CBO's Holtz-Eakin further stated that, "[1]isten to any group talk about this law
and you hear widely divergent opinions about the benefits that will be embodied in
it as we go forward." Id.
159

The Defense of Medicare and Real Medicare Prescription Drug Act, S.

1992, 108th Cong. (2003).
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consumers and pharmaceutical companies are looking at a future of
more legislation, which will necessarily have to incorporate more
responses to reimportation demands, much like what the PMAA was
attempting to do in July 2003.

VI. Conclusion
Congress' most recent attempts at legislation concerning
high-priced pharmaceuticals in the United States fail because they are
temporary, shortsighted solutions. Legislators know that consumers
want a solution to this problem now, so they are forced to present a
response. While the PMAA focuses on reimportation initiatives, such
an exclusive solution is limited as it confronts the problem only after
the United States-produced pharmaceuticals have twice crossed the
United States-Canadian border, instead of immediately upon their
release in the United States. Even if broad reimportation measures
were to provide some temporary relief to consumers, the root of the
problem would not be dealt with adequately.
Those following this issue must realize that the Medicare Act
will not be the last in what is beginning to look like a long series of
attempts to appease both contentious sides of the drug pricing issue.
While the Medicare Act is an attempt to re-modify existing
legislation, it is hardly a new or comprehensive solution. While there
are serious doubts that the next battle will be for price equalization
with Canada, United States consumers will demand dramatic cuts in
pharmaceutical prices before 2006. Consequently, expect Congress to
be back dealing with the pharmaceutical pricing issue soon.

